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Kronic Hysteria: Exploring the intersection between Australian synthetic cannabis 
legislation, the media, and drug-related harm 
Abstract 
Background: Having first appeared in Europe, synthetic cannabis emerged as a drug of 
concern in Australia during 2011. Kronic is the most well-known brand of synthetic cannabis 
in Australia and received significant media attention. Policy responses were reactive and 
piecemeal between state and federal governments. In this paper we explore the relationship 
between media reports, policy responses, and drug-related harm. 
Methods: Google search engine applications were used to produce time-trend graphs 
detailing the volume of media stories being published online about synthetic cannabis and 
Kronic, and also the amount of traffic searching for these terms. A discursive analysis was 
then conducted on those media reports that were identified by Google as ‗key stories‘. The 
timing of related media stories was also compared with self-reported awareness and month of 
first use, using previously-unpublished data from a purposive sample of Australian synthetic 
cannabis users. 
Results: Between April and June 2011, mentions of Kronic in the media increased. The 
number of media stories published online connected strongly with Google searches for the 
term Kronic. These stories were necessarily framed within dominant discourses that served to 
construct synthetic cannabis as pathogenic and created a ‗moral panic‘. Australian state and 
federal governments reacted to this moral panic by banning individual synthetic cannabinoid 
agonists. Manufacturers subsequently released new synthetic blends that they claimed 
contained new unscheduled chemicals.  
Conclusion: Policies implemented within in the context of ‗moral panic‘, while well-
intended, can result in increased awareness of the banned product and the use of new yet-to-
be-scheduled drugs with unknown potential for harm. Consideration of regulatory models 
should be based on careful examination of the likely intended and unintended consequences. 
Such deliberation might be limited by the discursive landscape. 
Key words: Discourse, Emergent Drug Trends, Internet, Policy, Synthetic Cannabis 
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Kronic Hysteria: Exploring the intersection between Australian synthetic cannabis 
legislation, the media, and drug-related harm 
Synthetic cannabis refers to products containing a herbal mixture that is then sprayed with 
synthetic cannabinoid agonists (Dargan, Hudson, Ramsey, & Wood, 2011; Dresen et al., 
2010; Schifano et al., 2009). Synthetic cannabis first emerged in Europe in 2004 with reports 
of a product called Spice producing effects that were very similar to cannabis, such as 
euphoria, increased sociability, relaxation, increased appetite, and sometimes anxiety and 
paranoia (Castellanos, Singh, Thornton, Avila, & Moreno, 2011; Psychonaut Web Mapping 
Research Group, 2009). These marked psychoactive effects were unlikely to have been 
produced by the largely inert herbal materials that Spice was purported to contain, which 
included: Althaea officinalis (Marshmallow), Canavalia maritima (Beach bean), Leonotis 
leonurus (Wild dagga), Leonotis sibericus (Siberian motherwort), Nelumbo nucifera (Pink 
lotus), Nymphaea caerulea (Blue lotus), Pedicularis densiflora (Indian warrior), Rosa cania 
(Dog rose), Scutellaria nana (Dwarf Skullcap), and Zornia latifolia (Maconha brava) 
(Psychonaut Web Mapping Research Group, 2009).  
An analysis of Spice (Auwärter et al., 2009; Lindigkeit et al., 2009) revealed that it contained 
a range of synthetic cannabinoid agonists. These chemicals included a homologue of CP 
47,497, which within the Australian Criminal Code Act of 1995, is considered an analogue of 
delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (Δ
9
-THC) based on the similarity of its structure to Δ
9
-THC. As 
such, possession of this product was a breach of federal law. However, outside of federal 
jurisdictions (e.g., airports, border control and universities), in those Australian states without 
analogues clauses within their drug acts, products containing this chemical were legal. 
JWH-018, or 1-Pentyl-3-(1-naphthoyl) indole, is another synthetic cannabinoid agonist that 
was identified to be present in Spice (Auwärter et al., 2009; Lindigkeit et al., 2009). JWH is 
an abbreviation for John W. Huffman, the individual who first synthesised these cannabinoid 
agonists. Later analyses have revealed a range of JWH‘s chemicals present in synthetic 
cannabis products including: JWH-019, JWH-022, JWH-073, JWH-122, JWH-250, & JWH-
398 (de Jager, Warner, Henman, Ferguson, & Hall, 2012; Fattore & Fratta, 2011; Hastie, 
2011). These chemicals were structurally dissimilar from Δ
9
-THC and other scheduled 
cannabinoid agonists, and thus were not considered analogues within the Australian Criminal 
4 
 
Code Act of 1995. Consequently, prior to legislative changes in 2011, products containing 
these chemicals were legal to supply and possess in all Australian states and territories.  
While anecdotal reports of synthetic cannabinoid use in Australia date back to 2005, it was in 
2011 that synthetic cannabis emerged as a drug of concern in Australia. Kronic has been the 
most well-known brand of synthetic cannabis in Australia with various blends produced, 
including Skunk, Purple Haze, Tropical, Pineapple Express, and Black Label. In April 2011, 
radio and tabloid newspapers first began reporting on the use of Kronic at Western Australian 
(WA) mine sites as a means of evading drug testing (Macdonald, 2011). Media interest 
swiftly grew, and by June the WA government moved to schedule seven synthetic 
cannabinoid agonists: JWH-018, JWH-073, JWH-122, JWH-200, JWH-250, CP 47,497, and 
the C8 Homologue of CP 47,497 (Misuse of Drugs (Amounts of Prohibited Drugs) Order 
(No. 2) 2011, Western Australia). 
Within days, new synthetic cannabis blends appeared that claimed to contain new 
unscheduled synthetic cannabinoid agonists. For example, Kronic released its ‗Black Label‘ 
blend specifically for its WA customers. This is consistent with the experience in the UK 
(Dargan et al., 2011) and the USA (Shanks, Dahn, Behonick, & Terrell, 2012) where analysis 
of synthetic cannabis blends available after bans found the presence of a range of new 
chemicals. De Jager et al. (2012) have reported that blends of Kronic purchased after bans in 
Australia contained chemicals previously unknown to them that were later revealed via mass 
spectra to be JWH-022 and AM2201.  
Then in August 2011, the media reported on a Perth man with a pre-existing heart condition 
who had a heart attack. While this event is not something the media would normally report 
on, the man had allegedly been smoking Kronic Black Label prior to his death (Phillips, 
2011). In a response to this alleged first ‗Kronic-related death‘, the WA government 
scheduled 14 more cannabinoid agonists (Poisons (Appendix A Amendment) Order (No. 2) 
2011). Again, new blends appeared that claimed to contain new unscheduled chemicals. 
Other Australian states followed WA‘s lead. South Australia outlawed 17 cannabinoid 
agonists (Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition (South Australia) Variation Regulations 2011, 
South Australia). In addition to the seven cannabinoid agonists that WA banned, the New 
South Wales government banned AM-694 (Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985, New 
South Wales). Tasmania outlawed four cannabinoid agonists (CP 47,497, JWH-018, JWH-
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073, and JWH-250), and also introduced an analogues clause into their Misuse of Drugs Acts 
(Misuse of Drugs Order 2011 (S.R. 2011, No. 74) - Reg 4, Tasmania). The Northern 
Territory banned 18 synthetic cannabinoid agonists (Misuse of drugs amendment (synthetic 
cannabinoids) regulations 2011 (No 33 of 2011), Northern Territory), while the Queensland 
government has proposed banning a total of 22 cannabinoid agonists and redefining the 
definition of what is considered a dangerous drug (Criminal and Other Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2011, Queensland; Drugs Misuse Amendment Regulation (No. 1) 2011, 
Queensland; Drugs Misuse Amendment Regulation (No. 2) 2011, Queensland). The new 
definition states that a dangerous drug includes anything that is intended to ―have a 
substantially similar pharmacological effect‖ to an illicit substance (Criminal and Other 
Legislation Amendment Bill, 2011).  
The Australian Therapeutic Goods Agency (TGA, 2011) received a request from the WA 
government to review the status of synthetic cannabinoid agonists, and subsequently 
scheduled eight cannabinoid agonists in July 2011. This made their possession a federal 
offence. Most Australian state drug acts refer to the Standard for the Uniform Scheduling of 
Medicines and Poisons (SUSMP) or Poisons Standard 2011, which is the legislative 
instrument over which the TGA has authority (The Standard for the Uniform Scheduling of 
Medicines and Poisons (SUSMP) also known as the Poisons Standard 2011, Australia). 
Consequently, products containing any of these eight cannabinoid agonists were by default 
illegal in states that had not specifically scheduled these chemicals.  
It might be suggested that the Australian legislative response to synthetic cannabis has been 
reactive and piecemeal rather than evidence-based. Some have suggested that banning each 
chemical as it emerges is like a dog chasing its own tail (Fattore & Fratta, 2011). Other 
commentators have described this approach to legislation as a merry-go-round—as one new 
drug gets discovered and banned, another one emerges purporting to be ‗legal‘ (Dargan et al., 
2011; Evans-Brown, Bellis, & McVeigh, 2011; Measham, Moore, Newcombe, & Welch, 
2010). So why has Australia‘s legislative response to synthetic cannabis not been evidence-
based? 
It is possible that media reports concerning synthetic cannabis created a moral panic that 
contributed to a legislative reaction. Early descriptions of moral panic, such as Cohen‘s 
(1972) analysis of ―Mods‖ and ―Rockers‖ in the UK, have noted that moral panic first 
6 
 
involves a person, group, episode, or situation being framed by the media as a threat to 
society. Sometimes the moral panic quickly dissipates, while other moral panics reach critical 
mass with significant and long lasting repercussions, such as changes in policy. In this 
respect, Brosius and Weimann (1996) have suggested that the media sets the agenda for 
policy debate.     
McArthur (1999, p. 151) has stated that the media ―shape[s] not only the public profile of 
[drug] problems but also the political response to them‖. Forsyth (2012) has proposed that 
once media reports concerning the emergence of a new drug break in the mainstream press, 
they will draw on the ‗drug scare‘ narrative that constructs the new drug as dangerous and the 
need for urgent action. In turn, a media campaign against the drug develops that recruits 
politicians, researchers and the morally righteous. The subsequent moral panic leads to a 
perception that urgent legislative action is required and is likely to result in policy that is 
reactive rather than responsive.  
Moral panic occurs within the context of the dominant discourses that exist within a society. 
For example, Cohen (1972) stated that ―by thrusting certain moral directives into the universe 
of discourse‖ the media can create drug problems ―suddenly and dramatically‖ (p. 10). 
Dominant discourses are linguistic frameworks inherent to any given culture that develop in 
symbiotic relationships with those institutions with power (Burr, 2003). They constrain what 
can be rationally said, written, and thought about drugs. Each discourse provides specific 
subject positions that demarcate the narratives that are coherent within the discourse (Burr, 
2003). These narratives, such as the ‗drug scare narrative‘, are perceived by individuals 
within the culture from which the dominant discourse emanates to hold the most ‗truth‘ 
value. Nonetheless, there are competing dominant discourses with some being more 
privileged than others, and it is in the interest of any given institution to promote those 
discourses that maintain the institution‘s version of reality as ‗truth‘ since this provides the 
institution with power.        
Bright, Marsh, Bishop and Smith (2008) undertook an analysis of the dominant discourses 
within Australia that frame Alcohol and Other Drugs (AOD). They examined newspaper 
reports of AOD over a 12 month period, and then triangulated this analysis with a sample of 
newspaper reports from five years prior and a televised debate on AOD. Bright et al. (2008) 
determined that in Australia, six dominant discourses framed AOD-related issues: medical, 
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moral, legal, political, economic, and glamour (see Table 1). Within medical discourse, for 
example, drug use is often pathologised such that drug users are sick. This limits the degree 
to which ‗recreational drug use‘ can be considered since any drug use is defined as inherently 
unhealthy. Within this discourse, experts are afforded a subject position that has significant 
authority and typically support the pathogenic narrative. Further, since medical discourse is 
paternal, the pathogenic narrative supports prohibition-based drug policy. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
The methodology used by Bright et al. (2008) might not be appropriate for understanding the 
discourses that framed the emergence of synthetic cannabis in Australia given its rapid 
emergence and the subsequent constant flux. Rather, methodologies that have explored the 
rapid emergence of new drugs might have more utility.  In this journal, Forsyth (2012) has 
recently described the phenomena of the ‗drug scare‘ using the UK experience with 
Mephedrone as a case study. He proposed that media reports about the emergence of a new 
drug that are fuelled by ‗moral panic‘ are unhelpful since they might divert attention from 
other more significant public health concerns (e.g., alcohol, diabetes, cardiovascular disease, 
cancer, etc.), and also provide free advertising through creating increased public awareness of 
the drug. Through examining online media, Forsyth was able to demonstrate that interest in 
buying mephedrone increased following sensationalist media coverage.  
The present study draws from Forsyth‘s (2012) methodology using Australian online media 
and self-reports from a sample of Australian synthetic cannabis users to understand how 
synthetic cannabis emerged as a drug of concern in 2011. In doing so, we aim to explore how 
the media, legislative change, and drug-related harm intersect. Discursive analysis was used 
to help disentangle this complex intersection. Such analysis is particularly useful here given 
the dynamic and rapid social changes that occurred in 2011, since it allows for subjective 
interpretations of the available anecdotal evidence given limited empirical data.  
Method 
Drawing from Forsyth‘s (2012) methodology, Google Trends was first used to produce time-
trend graphs detailing the number of stories being published online about synthetic cannabis 
and Kronic, and also the amount of traffic searching for these terms. Google Trends also 
generates links to media reports at key milestones. Forsyth has noted some limitations in 
8 
 
using this application since Google is not the only search engine; however, it is the most 
widely used. Further, Google Trends are normalised so the graphs do not represent the 
absolute number of searches conducted or the number of media stories. Additionally, the 
media volume reported is dependent on the parameters that Google uses to determine if text 
is a ‗news story‘.      
It is reasonable to assume that the ways in which the Australian online media was able to 
frame the emergence of synthetic cannabis was limited by the available dominant discourses. 
As such, the discourse and narratives were examined within the key reports generated by 
Google Trends. This examination was conducted by the first author (SB). It was iterative and 
involved consideration of the various subject positions that were available within the text, in 
addition to the way in which synthetic cannabis was constructed. As each discourse emerged, 
it was considered within the context of the institutions that support and maintain the 
discourse. Finally, the discourse was considered within the context of Bright et al.‘s (2008) 
delineation of the dominant discourses available for AODs in Australia.  
To ensure credibility (Lietz, 2010), the data were triangulated with radio media. Two 
episodes of the Australian Broadcasting Commission‘s (ABC) Triple J show ―Hack‖ that 
reported on synthetic cannabis were analysed. The first show, entitled ―Cheating workplace 
drug tests‖, aired on May 10 (Quartermaine, Tilley, Barrington, & Sawrey, 2011). The 
second show was entitled ―National Kronic ban‖ and aired on July 7 (Tilley & Sawrey, 
2011). Purposeful sampling of media reports and social media was also conducted to 
reconstruct a timeline of the emergence of, and response to, synthetic cannabis. In addition, 
thick descriptions were provided of each text that used direct quotes to ensure that the 
analysis stayed true to the original text.   
Rigour was ensured through an audit trail that documented the analysis and the reasoning that 
underpinned the emergent discourses (Morse, 1994). Thoughtful consideration of the 
discursive researcher‘s (SB) standpoint and opinions was documented in the audit trail to 
ensure reflexivity. This can be summarised in the following disclosure statement: 
I dislike paternalism since I value freedom of choice and believe that 
drug users can rationally weigh up the pros and cons of drug use in the 
context of the available evidence regarding harm. I believe that drug 
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policy is rarely developed in the context of the available evidence and is 
often reactive in nature. 
By including this statement, we acknowledge that it is impossible for the researcher to be 
‗objective‘ or ‗neutral‘ in the production of knowledge. Subjectivity, while once seen as 
negative or as bias to be eliminated, can be used as a fruitful path to greater understanding of 
the subject matter and our role in its construction. Instead, readers should interpret our paper 
with knowledge of the discursive researcher‘s positioning as stated above. 
Finally, two pieces of previously-unpublished data were included in this paper from a study 
by the final author and colleagues (Barratt, Cakic & Lenton, in press): (a) month and year of 
first use of synthetic cannabis, and (b) where synthetic cannabis users first reported hearing 
about the drug. A purposive sample of 316 Australian synthetic cannabis users answered 
these questions as part of an online survey. A description of the sample and the survey 
methodology has been published elsewhere (Barratt et al., in press). 
Findings and Discussion 
Figures 1 and 2 contain graphs produced using Google Trend. The lower line in each figure 
depicts the volume of media stories being published online that referred to Kronic and 
synthetic cannabis respectively. The upper line in each figure indicates how many people 
were searching for ―Kronic‖ and ―synthetic cannabis‖. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, the 
first online media stories about synthetic cannabis and Kronic began to emerge in March, 
with a sharp increase in the number of stories in May and June.  
The first key story concerning Kronic was from The Age on June 8 (indicated by ‗A‘ in 
Figure 1) and was entitled ―Roadtesting Kronic: Is fake grass worth the hype?‖. This ‗gonzo 
journalism‘ piece describes the author‘s experience of smoking Kronic and is framed within 
neo-liberal and economic discourse. For example, the author states that ―so many people 
were having fun with [Kronic] that the anti-fun brigade had no choice but to swing into 
action‖ and compared the effects of Kronic to ―two glasses of champagne‖. Bright et al. 
(2008) note that within the dominant Australian discursive landscape, only alcohol, tobacco, 
and caffeine can typically be framed within economic discourse, which means that this story 
is framed outside of the dominant discourses.  
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[Insert Figure 1 & 2 about here] 
Similarly, the individuals who were interviewed as part of the first radio report on Kronic in 
May (Quartermaine et al., 2011) framed their use of Kronic outside of dominant discourses. 
Again, use of Kronic was framed within neo-liberal and economic discourse. For example, 
interviewees stated how they made an informed choice to use Kronic in which the harms 
associated with failing a drug test outweighed the unknown harms associated with using 
chemicals with little to no toxicology data. Further, they described responsible use of Kronic, 
such as not using it before or during work, which also falls outside of the dominant 
discourses.  
Such initial framing was possible without widespread concern regarding synthetic cannabis 
and is consistent with Forsyth‘s (2012, p. 198) observation that initial reports regarding a new 
drug are generally published in alternative publications such as music press (e.g., Triple J 
Radio) ―or equivalent specialist sections of mainstream titles‖ (e.g., The Age). For example, 
in the UK a report preceding the moral panic regarding Mephedrone appeared in the 
Telegraph by a prominent medical personality entitled ―I took Mephedrone and I liked it‖ 
(Pemberton, 2010). Despite being situated outside of the dominant discursive frameworks, 
such early stories increase the public‘s awareness and might provide an advertisement for the 
emergent drug. Indeed, as can be seen from the upper line in Figure 1, the number of 
Australian‘s searching for Kronic on Google began increasing significantly around this time. 
It is interesting to note that ―Kronic‖ was more searched than ―synthetic cannabis‖, perhaps 
highlighting the effect that the media had on ‗branding‘ synthetic cannabis. This is similar to 
the way in which MDMA was branded as Ecstasy in the early 1980‘s, perhaps since the latter 
term created additional public interest and may have contributed to the moral panic that 
precipitated the prohibition of MDMA in the USA (Eisner, 1989). 
The increased awareness also provides an impetus for a ‗moral panic‘, with subsequent 
stories framed within the dominant discourses. The second key story concerning Kronic was 
published by the Sydney Morning Herald on 16 June and was entitled ―WA becomes first 
state with Kronic ban‖ (see ―B‖ in Figure 1). Interestingly, the first and only relevant key 
story concerning synthetic cannabis was also about legislative change – this time the South 
Australian government‘s intention to ban synthetic cannabis (see ―A‖ in Figure 2). Both 
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stories were framed within dominant discourses. Specifically, they were framed within legal, 
medical and moral discourse.  
Within medical discourse synthetic cannabis was constructed as a pathogen with similar (or 
greater) dangers to cannabis. Such constructions were typically reinforced by experts 
attesting to these dangers. Within this discursive framework, primacy is given to those 
individuals assuming the subject position of expert. This subject position is highly regarded 
in contemporary society, and might be considered to have subsumed the role of the priest as 
the figure of authority. Like the priest, the information provided by a medical expert is not 
necessarily ‗true‘ despite it being perceived as holding the greatest ‗truth‘ value. Indeed, there 
are often little to no toxicity data for most emergent drugs. For example, Forsyth (2012) 
noted that it was the news of a Mephedrone-related death that was later found to be false, 
which provided the impetus for the UK government to refer the matter to the Advisory 
Council on the Misuse of Drugs.   
Similarly, the second ABC radio show that aired in July focused on the national legislative 
changes. Here, the federal secretary for health assumed the subject position of expert. From 
this position she was able to authoritatively declare that synthetic cannabis is ―just not safe‖, 
causing hallucinations and heart palpitations. While there have been increasing reports of 
synthetic cannabis harms, a recent survey of 316 Australian community-based synthetic 
cannabis users found that while such effects were reported by around one third of the sample, 
very few respondents reported that their symptoms were serious enough to seek help and 
many respondents did not report experiencing these harms (Barratt et al., in press). Barratt et 
al.‘s (in press) survey results also indicate that a desire to use a legal recreational drug was 
one of the main reasons for first trying synthetic cannabis. Consistent with medical discourse, 
there was no available subject position for recreational drug users with the secretary stating 
that there ―is no therapeutic reason to be using [synthetic cannabinoid agonists] and that‘s 
why they‘ve been banned‖.     
Within moral discourse, users assume the subject position of an irresponsible deviant. For 
example, the South Australian Attorney-General expressed a concern that ―users are driving 
under the influence, posing a serious danger to themselves and others‖. Such constructions, 
alongside the pathogenic narrative available within medical discourse, indicate a need for 
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urgent legislative intervention. In turn, these discourses provided a fertile environment for 
‗moral panic‘. 
This moral panic is likely to have contributed to the first wave of bans that occurred in June 
and July of 2011 since Australian governments had a moral imperative to take urgent 
legislative action. Such urgent action was naturally reactive and led to a number of bans 
placed on individual synthetic cannabinoid agonists.  Although authorities may be well-
intentioned as they prohibit emerging drugs like synthetic cannabinoid agonists, the 
unintended consequences of these policies may have increased harm to some users since the 
reporting of each scheduling decision creates increased awareness. Such increased awareness 
could lead to increased use of synthetic cannabis.  
Indeed, as can seen be from the lower lines in Figures 1 and 2, online media interest first 
increased in the lead up to the first wave of bans in June and July. There was also an increase 
in the number of Australians searching for ―Kronic‖ and ―synthetic cannabis‖, as indicated by 
the lower lines in Figures 1 and 2, which tracks in relative accordance with the increased 
volume in media. It is reasonable to assume that many of these individuals would not have 
previously been aware of synthetic cannabis. The first hit for a Google search for ‗Kronic to 
be banned‘ that we conducted in June was an Australian-based online Kronic shop, and 
Google advertisements at the end of many commercial online media reports were for online 
shops selling synthetic cannabis. Kronic could not have asked for better advertising. For 
example, Green (2011) reported on a man who ―saw [Kronic] on the news and thought... holy 
smoke, I‘m going to order this‖.  
Barratt et al.‘s (in press) survey collected as-yet-unpublished data on the month that 
respondents first used synthetic cannabis. Reported in Figure 3, this data appear to be 
indicative of two distinct cohorts of Australians who initiated synthetic cannabis use in 2011: 
(i) those whose initial use preceded media reporting, and (ii) those who initiated use at around 
the same time as reports about Kronic peaked in the media. A statistical analysis of the data 
indicated that those who used synthetic cannabis for the first time in 2011 or 2012, which was 
when media interest began to heighten, were also significantly more likely to have reported to 
have heard about it through the media, whereas those used synthetic cannabis for the first 
time before 2011 were significantly more likely to have heard about it through other means 
(e.g., social media, friends, vendors, etc.), χ
2 
(1, N = 273) = 15.7) p < 0.001. 
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In the lead up to the bans, people reportedly tried to stockpile Kronic (Rickard, 2011), and 
Kronic manufacturers endeavoured to sell any remaining stock. Kronic distributors used 
social media, especially Facebook and Twitter, to engage their customers. These technologies 
provided a unique way of monitoring drug-related social interactions in real-time. For 
example, a post on the Kronic Facebook page from June reads: 
we only found out about the ban today so just clearing out the last of our 
stock. It has to be gone by 2mmorow close of business so we have 2 
options… give heaps away for free or just dispose of it tomorrow. I know 
what we‘d prefer!  
Hundreds of Facebook users ‗liked‘ and commented on this and other posts. For example, 
‗James‘ stated ―I want some, no money but I‘ve already bought heaps from yas [sic] so give 
me it for free‖.  
The announcement by the WA government to ban seven synthetic cannabinoid agonists also 
led to a ―smoke ‗em party‖ that was shut down by police as a matter of public safety. The 
party was moved to another venue, but then cancelled following further police intervention 
(―Kronic Party Plans up in Smoke‖, 2011).  
The next key Kronic story according to Google Trends was published in The Brisbane Times 
on June 30. Entitled ―NZ importer admits Kronic contaminated‖, this story describes the 
findings from an analysis of Kronic conducted by the New Zealand governments that found 
traces of a novel benzodiazepine. This story was primarily framed within medical discourse, 
with the incident constructed as a ―contamination‖. 
Just days after the WA government banned seven synthetic cannabinoid agonists, new 
products were released that claimed to circumvent the legislative changes. One such product 
was Kronic ―Black Label‖. The final key Kronic-related story, which was published on 
August 5 in The Australian, described how a man who was ―believed‖ to have been smoking 
Kronic ―Black Label― was rushed to hospital after ―suffering a suspected heart attack‖. He 
later died. Entitled ―WA police query banned drug Kronic link to man‘s death‖, this story 
was framed within medical and legal discourse. Again, the potential harms associated with 
Kronic indicated an urgent need for legislative intervention. In response to this death, the WA 
government banned an additional 14 cannabinoid agonists (Poisons (Appendix A 
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Amendment) Order (No. 2) 2011, Western Australia). Again, media interest and internet 
traffic searching for ―Kronic‖ and ―synthetic cannabis‖ increased in the lead up to these bans, 
as can be seen in Figure 1 and 2.  
Conclusions 
By examining the emergence of synthetic cannabis as a drug of concern in Australia, the 
present paper aimed to help understand how the media, legislative change, and drug-related 
harm intersect. The notion of dominant discourses was proposed to be helpful in 
understanding this relationship since they will demarcate how the media constructs the 
emergence of a new drug, how policy makers are able to frame the debate, and in turn, 
people‘s drug using behaviour.  
The pre-existing Australian dominant discourses, as outlined by Bright et al. (2008), appear 
to have led to the construction of synthetic cannabis as a dangerous pathogen. This 
construction may have contributed to a ‗moral panic‘. The moral panic appears to have been 
fuelled by experts highlighting the potential dangers of the new drug. Whilst such claims are 
presumably intended to reduce the likelihood of people using these substances, they might 
not be completely accurate given an absence of toxicological data and do not appear to be a 
deterrent.  For example, Forsyth (2012) found that the most significant increases in interest in 
purchasing Mephedrone occurred following each report of an alleged Mephedrone-related 
death.  A similar trend has been reported by Dasgupta, Mandl and Brwonstien (2009), who 
found that the number of overdoses from prescription opiates increased significantly two to 
six months after major stories concerning prescription opiates broke in the media.  
Given the truth value of these expert statements within the dominant discourse, governments 
have a moral imperative to ban the new drug. This can lead to reactive polices that may have 
a negative impact on drug-related harm since: (i) further awareness is created which could 
increase harm as more individuals try synthetic cannabis, and (ii) once banned, newer, less-
understood psychoactive products enter the market to replace the banned drug. Thus, while 
the availability of the newly illegal drug decreases following prohibition, other similar drugs 
with unknown health harms become more available in their place. Even if the new products 
do not contain new legal chemicals, and in fact contain recently scheduled chemicals, 
consumers are then at heightened risk of prosecution for possession of a product they 
believed to be legal. The possession of synthetic cannabinoid agonists could be treated more 
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severely than the possession of cannabis in Australia since individuals charged with 
possession of synthetic cannabinoid agonists might not be eligible to participate in cannabis 
diversion schemes.  
An alternative approach would have been to have regulated this market. Regulation would 
mandate the provision of accurate information, purity and strength. There is currently a 
disincentive for companies to provide information to potential users about the active 
ingredients or about safer ways to consume synthetic cannabis. To avoid litigation, most 
brands of synthetic cannabis state that they are ―not for human consumption‖, misrepresent 
what they contain, or provide obscure instructions for use. For example, a packet of Kronic‘s 
Pineapple Express stated that it ―contains a unique blend of all natural organic extracts‖ and it 
―emits a pleasant, relaxing smoke when burned‖. The lack of quality control is evident in the 
recall of this particular brand of Kronic due to it accidentally containing a novel 
benzodiazepine (Couch & Madhavaram, 2012).  
Restrictions on where and to whom synthetic cannabis could be sold would also be easier to 
manage in a regulated environment. Some (e.g., Evans-Brown et al., 2011; Hughes & 
Winstock, in press) suggest that emerging psychoactive substances be regulated as medicinal 
products as a pragmatic compromise to the current, arguably unsustainable, approach. We 
believe Australia should also consider alternative models of regulation, based on careful 
examination of the likely intended and unintended consequences. The recently regulatory 
scheme proposed by the New Zealand government provides an example of such alternative 
models (Office of the Associate Minister of Health, 2012). It will be interesting to see how 
this new model affects the synthetic cannabis market and drug-related harm.  
Evidence-based policy development must consider a psychoactive substance within the 
complex interrelationships between state and federal legislation, media reporting and 
dynamic webs of supply and demand. The unpredicted and unintended outcomes of drug 
policy typically result from inadequete consideration of these factors. For example, 
workplace drug testing is a well-intentioned policy that aims to reduce drug-related harm, but 
has had the unintended effect of producing a market for synthetic cannabis as a substitute for 




However, it is unlikely that Australia‘s response to synthetic cannabis will consider 
alternative models of regulation. In May 2012, eight broad chemical groups were scheduled 
by the TGA: Benzoylindoles, Cyclohexylphenols, Dibenzopyrans, Naphthoylindoles, 
Naphthylmethylindoles, Naphthoylpyrroles, Naphthylmethylindenes, and 
Phenylacetylindoles (TGA, 2012). In addition, they scheduled ―synthetic 
cannabinomimetics‖, though no definition of this term has been provided. Only time will tell 
what effects (both intended and unintended) this latest legislative actions will have on drug-
related harm.  
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Table 1. Description of the dominant AOD-related discourses in Australia, as reported by Bright et al. (2008).  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Discourse Subject positions Narrative 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Economic Consumers and Businesses Alcohol and Other Drugs (AOD) are something that are made, bought, and sold, in 
the same way as any other product or service (e.g., bread or a taxi fare) 
Medical   Patients and Experts Using AOD is like having a disease and health professionals can cure it. 
Moral Irresponsible/Deviants and Using drugs is wrong because of the negative effect they have on a person‘s  
 Morally Righteous  behaviour. 
Legal Law breakers, Law abiders and Using drugs is against law and people who use them should be arrested. 
 Law Enforcers  
Political  Constituents and Politicians  People cannot make the right decisions about drugs so we need to help them by 
making policies, thus protecting society. 






Figure 1. Google Trends data for ‗Kronic‘ in Australia for 2011. 
 
Note: The letters indicate the publication of key stories. The headlines for these are: (A) Roadtesting Kronic: Is fake grass worth the hype? (B) 
WA becomes first state with Kronic ban, (C) NZ importer admits Kronic contaminated, (D) WA Police query banned drug Kronic link to man's 
death, & (E) Tall Black slapped with one-year ban for Kronic use. The lower line represents the volume of stories being published about Kronic 
and the upper line represents the number of searches for Kronic. 
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Figure 2. Google Trends data for ‗synthetic cannabis‘ in Australia for 2011. 
 
Note: The letters indicate the publication of key stories. Only story A was included in the analysis as the other stories were from New Zealand. 






Figure 3. Month and year that participants from Barratt et al.‘s (in press) survey respondents who reported first trying synthetic cannabis in 2011 












Note: As Google Trends does not provide raw data, the volume of media reports is only an approximation. Further, the data is normalised and 
does not represent the absolute number of media stories. 
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